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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

i

Plaintiff-Appellee,

\t

v •

i

CINDY BLAIR,

lt

Case No. 920582-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant, i
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Cindy Blair appeals her conviction for
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), a third degree felony,
entered upon jury verdict, in the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page,
presiding.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The three issues identified by defendant on appeal can
be more succinctly addressed under two issues, as follows:
1.

Did the trial court erroneously admit evidence of

cocaine possession, consisting of items found in defendant's
garbage can, over defendant's "other bad acts" or "character
evidence" objection?
Appellant).

(Responding to Issue 1 in Br. of

In part, this issue implicates Rule 404, Utah Rules

of Evidence; Rule 404 admissibility has been held to be a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

question of law, reviewed without deference to the trial court.
See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991).

Rule

403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is also involved; a trial court's
ruling under this provision is reviewed deferentially on appeal,
for "abuse of discretion."
2.

Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572.

Did defendant have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the contents of her garbage can, placed curbside for
collection, such that the warrantless seizure of those contents
violated her state constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures?

(Issues 2 and 3 in Br. of Appellant).

Ultimately this question is one of law, reviewed without
deference to the trial court, addressing whether any privacy
expectation that defendant might have entertained is also one
which society is prepared to accept as legitimate.

See Taylor,

818 P.2d at 565-67.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads in pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same;
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.

2
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges and Pretrial Motions
Defendant and her husband were charged jointly with
possession of a controlled substance (R. 20). l The physical
evidence against them consisted of cocaine residue and apparent
cocaine paraphernalia seized from the couple's garbage can on
three occasions, and similar material seized upon a subsequent,
warrant-supported search of their home (R. 9-10, 12-14).

A

pretrial motion to suppress that evidence under Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution was denied (trial court's
ruling, R. 49-53, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant).
Objections to the evidence under evidentiary rules were also
denied (R. 61; T. 25-30).

*Record citations are to the main record, "R.,H and to the
transcript of the April 15, 1992 trial, "T."
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Statement of Facts
Acting on an informant's tip that defendant and her
husband were involved in drug sales or use, narcotics
investigators, on three successive weeks, retrieved the couple's
garbage, set out for collection on the street in front of their
home (R. 12-14, 49). In the garbage, the investigators found
small tinfoil pieces, pipes made from beverage cans, cigarette
lighters, and burned spoons and ballpoint pen tubes:

some of

these items contained residue that tested positive for cocaine
(R. 12-14).

Upon this information, a circuit court judge issued

a warrant to search the couple's home (R. 16-17).
Similar physical evidence was found during the warrantsupported home search (R. 9-10).

Some of that evidence,

including a white residue that tested positive for cocaine, was
found in the home's master bedroom (T. 51-52, 101-02).

The use

of the tinfoil, spoons, pen tubes, and so forth for preparing and
ingesting cocaine was described to the jury at trial (T. 50-56).
The jury also heard that during the search, defendant commented
that a picture frame seized in the bedroom had cocaine on it (T.
84-85); testing proved her comment to be accurate (T. 102-03).
Finally, the jury heard that near the end of the home search,
defendant waived her "Miranda" rights and told the searching
officers "that she wanted some help and that she had been using
drugs" (T. 57-58).

4
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Verdict and Trial Court Disposition
Upon trial, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful
drug possession, but acquitted her husband (R. 57, 119-20).
Pursuant to the verdict, defendant was sentenced to zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison; this was suspended, and probation
ordered (R. 132-33).

A certificate of probable cause was then

granted, and the jail time provision of defendant's probation was
stayed pending the resolution of this appeal (R. 130-31).

On

appeal, defendant reasserts her challenge to the admissibility of
the physical evidence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim that evidence seized from her garbage
can was inadmissible "other bad acts" or "character" evidence
fails under settled law.

The evidence showed ongoing cocaine use

in defendant's home, and was therefore relevant to show
possession and knowledge of such possession, essential elements
of the charged crime, quite apart from whatever tenuous
"character" inference might be drawn from it.

Because the

evidence was not offered solely to show defendant's character,
then, it was admissible.
This Court should also reject defendant's argument that
the evidence taken from her garbage can was unconstitutionally
seized under the Utah Constitution.

Federal law is clear that

citizens have no legitimate privacy expectation in garbage placed
curbside for collection.

This federal principle is neither

unclear nor inconsistent, and defendant has shown no reason to

5
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fashion a different rule under the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the evidence taken from defendant's garbage can was
admissible, as was other evidence derived from it.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S GARBAGE
CAN WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE, FOR IT TENDED TO PROVE AN ELEMENT
OF THE CHARGED CRIME, AND WAS NOT OFFERED
SOLELY AS "CHARACTER" EVIDENCE.
Defendant first argues that the evidence seized from
her garbage can was improperly admitted under Rules 403, 404, and
405, Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. of Appellant at 8). She also
invokes Rule 609 (id,, at 11). Proceeding in roughly reverse
order, these evidentiary rules do not assist defendant.
A.

Rules 405 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidencer
Addressing Only "Character," Do Not APPIV.
By its terms, Rule 405 addresses methods of proving

character, when character traits are in issue.

However, the

crime of unlawfully possessing controlled substances contains no
"character" element.

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992).

In State v. Sisneros, 581 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1978), the question of
defendant's general good character was held irrelevant to the
issue of whether he had committed the charged sexual offense.
Similarly here, defendant's character, good or bad, has no
bearing on the question of whether she possessed controlled
substances.

Therefore Rule 405 has no application.

Rule 609 also is off-point.

That rule deals with the

use of a witness's prior criminal convictions for general

6
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impeachment purposes.

The cocaine residue and paraphernalia

found in defendant's garbage do not show a past conviction, by
"public record" or otherwise.

Further, that evidence was not

used to make defendant out to be a generally dishonest person.
Instead, it was direct substantive evidence that defendant was in
fact guilty of the drug possession offense. As such, it was
properly placed before the jury, to weigh against defendant's
protestation of innocence.
B.

See Sisneros, 581 P.2d at 1342.

The Evidence Was Admissible Under Rule 404 to
Prove the Intent Element of the Offense.
Rule 404 generally bars the use of "character evidence"

to prove that a person "acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion . . .."

Once more, it is doubtful that

evidence of having discarded the contraband said anything to the
jury about defendant's character.

Rather than showing "bad

character," it could just as well suggest that defendant, as a
tidy housekeeper, was of "good character."

Again, this would not

necessarily prevent the jury from finding her guilty of unlawful
drug possession.
Even assuming that evidence found in her garbage says
anything about defendant's general character, that evidence was
admissible under Rule 404.
"inclusionary" rule.
(Utah App. 1991).

Specifically, Rule 404(b) is an

See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568-70

As such, it permits admission of "all evidence

of other crimes except that evidence that proves only criminal
disposition."

Id., at 568 (emphasis added) (citing 2 J. Weinstein

& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 404[08] (1990)).
7
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Thus

evidence tending to show "bad character" is admissible if, as
stated in the rule, it serves "other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
The evidence of cocaine use in defendant's garbage
clearly met the inclusionary "other purposes" standard of Rule
404(b).

On the day of the home search, defendant claimed that a

friend of hers named Wendy "always came over and brought cocaine
over to the house . . . " (T. 58). This suggested that the
contraband had found its way into the home not through defendant,
but passively or accidentally, through her friend.
The drug possession offense entails a knowing and
intentional mental state, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)
(Supp. 1992).

The evidence in defendant's garbage over three

successive weeks, tending to show repeated, ongoing cocaine use,
belied the suggestion that defendant's friend, not defendant, was
the person who knowingly and intentionally brought cocaine into
the home.

Thus the trial court correctly admitted the evidence

under Rule 404 (T. 30). See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 569-70, and
cases cited therein.
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Tarafa, 720
P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), is misplaced.

Tarafa did not involve

improper admission of "other crimes" evidence.

Instead, it

involved prosecutor misuse of such evidence, actually introduced
by the defendant.

The Tarafa prosecutor repeatedly assailed the

defendant's character, by stating, for example, "He's a thief

8
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with a criminal mind," during closing argument.
1372.

720 P.2d at

That use of the defendant's other crimes, well beyond

impeachment purposes, was reversible error.

Id.

Here, in contrast, nothing in the prosecutor's closing
argument (T. 144-48, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant)
resembled an attack on defendant's character.

Rather, the

prosecutor simply argued the conflicting evidence—that is, the
presence of contraband in and about defendant's home versus
defendant's disclaimer of responsibility for it.

The "other

crimes" evidence in defendant's garbage, then, was both correctly
admitted under Rule 404, and properly utilized at trial.
C.

The Evidence Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 403,
for it Was Not Unfairly Prejudicial.
While Rule 404 permits admission of "other crimes"

evidence, the "probative versus prejudicial" weighing of Rule
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, should also be done.
P.2d at 571.

Taylor, 818

To be excluded under Rule 403, the probative value

of the challenged evidence must be substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.

jDd. at 571

(quoting the rule, emphasis partly in original).

Trial courts

have relatively broad discretion under Rule 403; rulings under it
are reversed on appeal only if they are "beyond the limits of
reasonability."

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah

1992); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572.
Factors guiding the Rule 403 weighing of other crimes
evidence include "the similarities between the [past and charged]
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
9
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the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."
P.2d at 571 (quoting authorities).

Taylor, 818

The evidence in question here

essentially showed conduct closely tied to the charged offense,
within the same place and general time frame.

Compare State v.

DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198-99 (Utah App. 1987) ("dope ledger"
seized in another state from scene of charged crime held
improperly admitted under Rule 403). It was not so remote as to
be inadmissible under Rule 403. Next, the presence of cocaine
residue and paraphernalia in her garbage was essentially the only
means of identifying defendant as a knowing cocaine possessor,
against the suggestion that her friend was the actual offender.
Against the factors weighing in favor of admissiblity,
it cannot be said that the evidence in question here was likely
to provoke "overmastering hostility" against defendant.

The

evidence involved no crime "more heinous" than the one charged,
Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572; instead, it only showed other instances
of the same conduct.

By comparison, in State v. Shickles, 760

P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
admission of evidence that the defendant, accused only of
kidnapping, had also sexually assaulted his victim.
Here, then, it cannot be said that the trial court
abused its Rule 403 discretion, or violated the limits of
reasonableness, in admitting evidence of past, recent cocaine use
in defendant's home (T. 30)• The admission of that evidence,
10
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otherwise proper under the rules of evidence, should be affirmed
on appeal.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT HAD NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HER CURBSIDE GARBAGE; THEREFORE,
THE WARRANTLESS POLICE SEIZURE OF THE GARBAGE
DID NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Defendant next contends that all evidence derived from
the warrantless seizure of her garbage should have been
suppressed under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
That provision, like the fourth amendment to the federal
constitution, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
For the purpose of briefing this point, the State will
assume that the physical evidence seized from defendant's home,
and the inculpatory statements made by defendant during the home
search, were the end result of an unbroken sequence of events
that began with the seizure and inspection of her garbage.

Thus

if the garbage was seized and searched in violation of the Utah
Constitution, both it and its derivative "fruits" presumptively
are to be suppressed.

See Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 198

Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 11 (Utah Oct. 22, 1992) (Howe, Assoc. C.J.,
dissenting) (a majority of Utah Supreme Court members have held
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that a state constitution-based exclusionary rule exists).2
Even so, defendant's argument cannot succeed.
For police conduct to fall within the ambit of the
fourth amendment, it must intrude upon a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in a given place, thing, or activity.

The test of

whether such an expectation exists is familiar, and contains two
parts.

First, the person claiming the expectation must "exhibit"

or "manifest" it.

Second, that expectation must be "objectively

reasonable," or "legitimate" in society's view.

California v.

Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); State
v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 565-66 (Utah App. 1991).

The same

analysis applies under Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990)

(plurality opinion).
Defendant acknowledges that her garbage was seized
after it had been placed out for collection at the roadside by
her home (Br. of Appellant at 4).

In denying defendant's state

constitution-based challenge to the garbage seizure, the trial
court, citing Greenwood, observed that under the fourth
amendment, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in garbage
set out for collection (R. 52). Accordingly, under federal
constitutional law, police officers may seize curbside garbage
2

The only argument the State reserves, should this Court hold
that the garbage seizure was improper under the Utah Constitution,
is that inasmuch as it comported with federal law, reasonably
relied upon by the officers, the garbage seizure could not be
"flagrant" police misconduct, to be remedied by suppression. See
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-91 & n.4 (Utah 1990) (describing
"attenuation" analysis).
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without a warrant.

This is so even assuming, as the Greenwood

Court did, that one may exhibit an expectation of privacy in such
garbage by, for example, placing in it opaque bags.

486 U.S. at

39, 108 S. Ct. at 1628. The Greenwood Court held that such an
expectation is unreasonable as a matter of law, given that
curbside garbage is "readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public."

486 U.S.

at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (footnotes omitted).
Even on appeal, defendant mounts no cogent argument
why, under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah
should depart from fourth amendment standards, and hold that a
state-based reasonable expectation of privacy exists in curbside
garbage.

She does not cite Greenwood, much less show that it

represents confusing or ill-reasoned federal precedent.

Compare

Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469 (decrying federal automobile search law
as a confusing "labyrinth," before fashioning new rules under
Article I, section 14), and State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 41718 (Utah 1991) (joining criticism of federal law regarding
privacy of bank records before creating new rule under Article I,
section 14). While independent state constitutional analysis of
search and seizure issues may be appropriate for protection
against "vagaries" and inconsistency in fourth amendment law, see
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988), defendant
has shown no such inconsistency here.
In fact, the fourth amendment-based Greenwood opinion
upheld "the vast majority of lower courts," in holding that there

13
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is no reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage.
U.S. at 37, 41-43, 108 S. Ct. at 1627, 1629-30.

486

Similarly, the

Colorado Supreme Court, construing Colorado's constitution in a
post-Greenwood case, has refused to find a state-based reasonable
expectation of privacy in curbside garbage.

This, the court

stated, accords with the "great weight of authority."

People v.

Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 1992).
Again, defendant has neither cited, distinguished, nor
identified error in the authority holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, under state or federal
constitutions, in curbside garbage.

That being the case, any

argument she might have for an extension of Article I, section 14
protection to such garbage has effectively been waived for lack
of adequate briefing.

See State v. Brown, No. 900148, slip op.

at 4 n.l (Utah Nov. 30, 1992) (absent briefing of differing state
and federal constitutional analyses, question of expanded state
protection will not be reached).
Further, Utah precedent weighs against a stateprotected privacy interest in curbside garbage.

In State v.

Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless search that was conducted incident to a lawful
arrest.

Some of the seized items were found in the wastebasket

of the hotel room where the arrest occurred.

While upholding the

seizures under the "plain view" and "search incident to arrest"
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the court also stated that
"[a] wastebasket carries an inference that anything put into it
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is intended to be discarded or destroyed.

It is not the same

privacy interest that exists in a drawer or in a footlocker . •
.."

584 P.2d at 857. Significantly, Austin did not purport to

rely on the fourth amendment; instead, only Article I, section 14
was cited.
Here the seized garbage was no longer even in a living
area when it was seized:
pickup.

it was placed curbside, for regular

Similarly, affirming a drug possession conviction in

State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam), this
Court recited, without criticism, that marijuana found in a
garbage can outside a residence, plus other observations, led to
issuance of a warrant to search the residence, resulting in the
conviction.

Given Austin and Phelps, along with the authority

from other jurisdictions, a Utah Constitution-based reasonable
expectation of privacy in curbside garbage is a dubious legal
suggestion.

This Court may reject that suggestion outright or,

under Brown, defer its consideration until another case when it
is more fully briefed.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant was convicted of the charged offense upon
properly received evidence. Accordingly, her conviction should
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2\

day of December, 1992,

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

J, KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney Gfeneral
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